The Rhetoric of Putin's Comments on Snowden
News Article: http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/hendrikhertzberg/2013/07/devilishly-clever-that-putin-fellow.html
I readily admit that I haven't made much of an effort to keep abreast of this whole situation regarding Edward Snowden. From what little I understand, I believe that Mr. Snowden leaked classified information for the purposes of drawing attention to possible violations of privacy by the government; I believe he subsequently fled to Russia to obtain political asylum (irony of ironies). Of this, I will say no more.
What catches my fancy is The New Yorker writer Hendrik Hertzberg's analysis of President Vladimir Putin's comments on the Snowden's situation. Through his careful analysis, Mr. Hertzberg draws out the subtle nuances of President Putin's speech.
While I do not intend to diminish Mr. Hertzberg's observations, I wonder how conscious President Putin was as to his actual shrewdness. That is to say, did President Putin intend to be as clever as Mr. Hertzberg claims, and does Putin's intention actually matter when considering the actual effect of his words?
To some extent, we enter the realm of speech acts and intentionality. My betters of the New Critics camps in the literature department might be quick to point out my falling to the intentional fallacy--the logical impropriety that privileges the place of human intention in interpreting any given text in light of the fact that one can never actually know intention. Well, I would argue that this is less a case of interpreting a text and more a case of identifying a character. Appropriating the terminology of legal jurisprudence--the act (actus reus) and the intention (mens rea)--may prove of benefit here. True, I cannot actually know Putin's mind. However, if I were able to, I would be able to identify whether his rhetorical display is intended or not. And much like murder (what an appropos example!), if the act is intended, then the degree of murder is greater.
Ah, but this only answers whether Putin is serendipitously brilliant, an idiot savant, or actually a terrifyingly powerful rhetor. A better question might have to do with the average reader such as myself: if I am largely unaware of Putin's careful use of language (i.e., all that Hertzberg has pointed out), does the effect remain? In layman's terms, this is the old question of whether a sound is made when a tree falls in the woods without anyone present to hear it.
While I am hesitate to answer that question broadly, I can speak to the issue in this specific case. If the the effects of Putin's speech (the perlocutionary act) go unnoticed, then I would tend to believe that no actual effect takes place. I am unsure if Professor Searle or the great Austin would agree, but perlocutionary acts seem to require acknowledgment and reception of the act by hearers. Of course, more can be said of this, but this will suffice for now.
I readily admit that I haven't made much of an effort to keep abreast of this whole situation regarding Edward Snowden. From what little I understand, I believe that Mr. Snowden leaked classified information for the purposes of drawing attention to possible violations of privacy by the government; I believe he subsequently fled to Russia to obtain political asylum (irony of ironies). Of this, I will say no more.
What catches my fancy is The New Yorker writer Hendrik Hertzberg's analysis of President Vladimir Putin's comments on the Snowden's situation. Through his careful analysis, Mr. Hertzberg draws out the subtle nuances of President Putin's speech.
While I do not intend to diminish Mr. Hertzberg's observations, I wonder how conscious President Putin was as to his actual shrewdness. That is to say, did President Putin intend to be as clever as Mr. Hertzberg claims, and does Putin's intention actually matter when considering the actual effect of his words?
To some extent, we enter the realm of speech acts and intentionality. My betters of the New Critics camps in the literature department might be quick to point out my falling to the intentional fallacy--the logical impropriety that privileges the place of human intention in interpreting any given text in light of the fact that one can never actually know intention. Well, I would argue that this is less a case of interpreting a text and more a case of identifying a character. Appropriating the terminology of legal jurisprudence--the act (actus reus) and the intention (mens rea)--may prove of benefit here. True, I cannot actually know Putin's mind. However, if I were able to, I would be able to identify whether his rhetorical display is intended or not. And much like murder (what an appropos example!), if the act is intended, then the degree of murder is greater.
Ah, but this only answers whether Putin is serendipitously brilliant, an idiot savant, or actually a terrifyingly powerful rhetor. A better question might have to do with the average reader such as myself: if I am largely unaware of Putin's careful use of language (i.e., all that Hertzberg has pointed out), does the effect remain? In layman's terms, this is the old question of whether a sound is made when a tree falls in the woods without anyone present to hear it.
While I am hesitate to answer that question broadly, I can speak to the issue in this specific case. If the the effects of Putin's speech (the perlocutionary act) go unnoticed, then I would tend to believe that no actual effect takes place. I am unsure if Professor Searle or the great Austin would agree, but perlocutionary acts seem to require acknowledgment and reception of the act by hearers. Of course, more can be said of this, but this will suffice for now.
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